In future, updating various software modules in vehicles on a regular basis will be required for various reasons such as update functionalities in the existing system, add new functionalities, remove software bugs, update navigation map etc. For updating software to a large number of vehicles, remote updating using mobile multicasting would be the most efficient and economic than unicast updating in service station. However, the security requirement of multicast communication, i.e., confidentiality and integrity of the information transmitted and authenticity of the group members, is challenging. In this paper, we investigate issues in designing key management architectures for secure multicast network, particularly for remote software update in future vehicles. Vehicular software distribution network is considered as wireless network where vehicles are connected to the software distributors through base stations. Since the network consists of vehicles and base stations, the network dynamics is characterized by quasi-permanent mobility, high speed and frequent hand-off. High mobility and frequent hand-off increase the complexity of dynamic group membership which results in increase complexity in key generation and distribution. However, unlike the other mobile hosts such as PDA, vehicles provide sufficient battery, computational power and memory which allow performing complex cryptographic algorithm. Taking these things into consideration, we propose to use decentralized key management technique to generate and distribute multicast session key to the group members. Consequently, we evaluate our proposed architecture based on key distribution efficiency, re-keying efficiency, computational complexity, key storage requirement and scalability. From our analysis, it is found that the set-up and re-keying time of the proposed mechanism is in the range of few milliseconds while it provides confidentiality, authenticity and data integrity.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern-day automobiles have implemented various advance features including drive-by-wire, telematics, precrash warning, navigation system, entertainment, electronic toll collection etc. These features along with the Intelligent Transportation System's (ITS) initiatives to use various communication and electronic technologies in vehicles to enhance road safety, mobility and traffic handling capability will considerably increase the complexity of vehicles' communication network, software and hardware modules. It will be necessary to update vehicles' software modules from time to time for various reasons. For examples, the Auto Company (AC) may want to add new applications, add/upgrade new functionalities in existing system, tune performance parameters, eliminate software bugs and so on. Instead of updating software in service station on individual basis, if the software could be updated remotely using wireless communication links, then it would be beneficial to both users and auto manufacturers in terms of labor, time and money. However, the following security issues should be addressed for remote software update:
1. Integrity: The software update method must protect the integrity of the software being transmitted via wireless link to prevent any malfunctioning of software modules. 2. Authentication: The system must authenticate the Software Vendor (SV) to protect the vehicles from uploading malicious software. Also, the vehicles to which AC wants to update software need to be authenticated so that only the desired vehicles get access to the new software. 3. Confidentiality: The system must maintain the privacy of the software to prevent the exposure of proprietary algorithms and codes from adversaries and competitors.
There are two scenarios for vehicles' software update: 1. A particular vehicle experiences some problems with its functionality. 2. An AC decides to add/upgrade features of a particular type of vehicles.
In the first case, software needs to be uploaded in one vehicle which is a unicast process. A secure unicast software upload technique via wireless communication link has been proposed in [1] . However, unicast process is very inefficient and expensive for uploading software in a large number of vehicles. Rather, multicast transmission of software packets will be more efficient since it allows simultaneous delivery of packets to
2006-01-1584
multiple users and thus reduce network bandwidth requirement [2] .
Although, IP-multicasting has been implemented efficiently to support group communications among static users [2] , multicast communication among mobile hosts in wireless network is still challenging due to inherent characteristics of mobile and wireless infrastructure [3] [4] . The security of multicast communication i.e., authenticity of the group members, and confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data is achieved by using a shared encryption key, known to the authorized members only. Although, the use of cryptographic technique using a secret key satisfies the security requirement, design of efficient key management scheme is the critical issue for the realization of a secure multicast communication system [5] .
Remote software upload in various electronic control units (ECU) of Intelligent Vehicles (IV) via wireless multicasting between roadside infrastructure and mobile vehicles has been proposed [6] [7] . In [6] it was shown that software upload using multicast process would require less bandwidth than the unicast process as well as it would be more cost effective. However, the security issue has not been addressed in [6] . A centralized flat key management scheme was proposed in [7] . In that scheme, a base station (BS) and the vehicles under that BS's coverage area forms a multicast group. Each vehicle shares a personal secret key with its corresponding BS which is established during authentication process. The multicast session key (SK) is sent to each vehicle individually, encrypted with its personal secret key. The SV sends the software packets to its nearest BS, the BS relays the packets to its nearby BSs and vehicles under its coverage area and so on. Although, the protocol is simple, requires very frequent handoff as vehicles move from one cell to another. Moreover, it relies on single entity (SV) to transmit the software packets.
In this paper, we suggest that, each AC or SV should have its regional offices which would be responsible for distributing the software within that region. The AC, regional offices and BSs form hierarchical architecture where the AC or SV sends the software packets to its regional offices, the regional office transmit the packets to BSs within that region and finally, the BSs broadcast these to vehicles. Several BSs in a region form a multicast group so that during handoff between cells there is no need for authentication and transmission of session key. This hierarchical architecture benefits from its distributed nature of group key management and less frequent authentication and key exchange, which consequently reduces the packet loss.
MULTICAST KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
Several group key management protocols for secure multicasting have been proposed in literature for both fixed and wireless network [8] [9] [10] . Since distribution and re-keying of SK incur extra burden in communication network, key management technique seeks to minimize this computation and communication burden by efficient key distribution as well as providing security requirements. The efficiency of a key management protocol may be measured by the following criterion [8] :
• Initial Keying Efficiency: Efficiency of initial group set up i.e., the number of messages exchanged for initial key distribution to the group members.
• Re-keying Efficiency: Number of messages exchanged for updating session key in case of key compromise or crypto-period rollover.
• Computation Requirements: Computation required by the key distributor and members to process keying messages.
• Storage Requirements: The number of keys the key distributor and members need to keep.
• Scalability: The protocol should scale well for large and small groups.
• Reliability: Re-keying messages must be delivered reliably to prevent loss of messages.
• On-time Delivery: The re-keying messages must be delivered in timely manner so that members receive the message before new key takes effect.
Depending on different features, requirements and goals, key management protocols can be classified into three categories [8] : 1) Centralized key management protocols, 2) Decentralized key management protocol and 3) Distributed key management protocol. In the following, we briefly present each protocol.
CENTRALIZED KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
A single key server, known as Key Distribution Center (KDC), is responsible for computing and distributing shared key to all group members which is used to encrypt and decrypt multicast data. A flat solution is presented in [4] where each of the n group members shares a personal secret key with Group Manager (GM). This secret key is used to send the SK during session set up and re-keying using unicast secure channel between GM and each member. The initial keying and re-keying complexity is O(n), GM storage and member storage complexities are O(n) and O(1), respectively. This protocol and other similar protocols, such as GKMP (Group Management Protocol) [11] [12] , are simple but not scalable. The tree based scheme known as Logical tree Hierarchy (LKH) proposed in [4] and [13] minimizes the number of messages for re-keying operation to O(log 2 n), but increases the users' key storage requirement to log 2 n +1, where log 2 n is the height of the tree. There are several other protocols such as One Way Function Tree (OFT), Way Function Chain Tree (OFCT), and Centralized Flat Table (CFT) etc. that have been proposed based on LKH and try to minimize the re-keying message even lesser [8] . The centralized approach is suitable for one-to-many group communication such as secure software distribution, news distribution etc. Since only one central entity controlling the whole group, this approach is susceptible to single-point failure and 1 affects n scalability problem during re-keying.
DECENTRALIZED KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
In this approach, the large group is divided into small subgroups and a subgroup manager controls a subgroup. The decentralization of the control makes the management role scalable and the system to be faulttolerant [8] . The most popular decentralized methods are Iolus [13] , IGKMP (Intra-domain Group Key Management Protocol) [14] , Kronos [15] , SAKM (A scalable and Adaptive Key Management Protocol) [16] . In Iolus, a Group Security Agent (GSA) manages each group and is responsible for establishing the SK for that group. The GSAs form another group managed by the Group Security Controller (GSC). In this scheme, the GSA locally controls the re-keying during group membership change, thus keep the other subgroups unaffected. Though, Iolus is scalable and it reduces the key storage requirement of GSC, it increases the computational complexity. Multicast message should be decrypted and re-encrypted by the GSAs before sending to its group members. The IGKMP is divided into administratively scoped areas where an Area Key Distributor (AKD) manages each area and the Domain Key Distributor (DKD) manages all AKDs. Unlike Iolus, the DKD generates the encryption key and propagates it to the members through the AKDs. Since all members in a domain use the same encryption key, data needs not to be locally decrypted and re-encrypted by the AKDs. However, if DKD is compromised, the whole group is affected and if any AKD is unavailable, members of that area is unavailable to access the group communication.
In Kronos, DKD does not directly generate the encryption key; instead each AKD independently generates the same encryption key based on some shared secret and transmits to the members at the end of a predetermined period. Kronos uses the previous key to generate the new key, thus compromise of one key results in compromise of the following keys. SAKM takes into account the dynamic aspect of group members. It starts with common encryption key within the group and dynamically partitioned the subgroups into clusters depending on members' behavior. Each cluster has its own encryption key and all subgroups under the cluster use the same key. The decentralized key management approaches are extended for wireless mobile multicasting [4, 9] to reduce the communication burden in re-keying. Since the approaches still depend on either group controller or subgroup controller to generate the encryption key, they still suffer from the single point fault problem.
DISTRIBUTED KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
In distributed protocols, there is no group controller, instead all the members contribute to generate group key [8] . Each participant shares a portion of a secret and contributes its share to generate the encryption key. This protocol is suitable for many-to-many communication where each member can have access control and can send or receive data. In most of the distributed protocols, the communication complexity and processing time of key generation increase linearly with the number of group members [8] . Some examples of such protocols are Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, Conference Key Agreement, Distributed One-way Function and Distributed Logical Key [8] .
The key management protocols mentioned above, assume that the re-keying of SK is necessary when group membership changes due to a member joins or leaves a multicast group or moves from one group to another as they change their geographical location. This ensures that a new member joining the session does not have access to the previous data (backward confidentiality) and members who left the group would not be able to access any future data (forward confidentiality). This scenario is appropriate for applications such as pay-per-view movie where if a person subscribes to watch a certain movie, he/she should not be allowed to watch any previously broadcasted movie or he/she should not have access to watch any other movie/game scheduled to broadcast later.
However, in automotive software distribution network, the AC needs to upload the entire software to all the vehicles of a particular type. Hence, there should not be any restriction to access any of the software packets by any vehicle. This unique feature makes our multicast architecture different than other previously depicted architecture. In the following section we recognize some features of multicast network for remote software upload in vehicles.
ITS COMMUNICATION NETWORK
The ITS communication network, as shown in Fig. 1 , can be considered as heterogeneous network consists of fixed and wireless network. Various ITS service providers and high-speed fixed networks connecting these service providers form the backbone network. Wireless networks such as DSRC (dedicated Short Range Communication), wireless LAN, cellular/IMT2000, and digital satellite broadcasting etc., which connect mobile vehicles to the fixed network, form the access network [17] . Each access network again composed of fixed hosts, BSs and mobile terminals (vehicles). An appropriate access network could be chosen depending on application and data type. For example, safety critical information, which requires low latency data communication within the immediate vicinity of a vehicle can use DSRC whereas non-safety applications such as traffic information, travel and transportation information etc. can use cellular technology.
Remote software upload in future vehicles is a nonsafety critical off-line process. Hence, an automotive company can utilize cellular technology or wireless LAN to upload new software or upgrade existing software in its vehicles for the following reasons. 
SECURE MULTICASTING FOR REMOTE SOFTWARE UPLOAD
Secure multicast network architecture for remote software upload in vehicles, as depicted in Fig. 2 , consists of software provider which could be either AC or SV named as Central manager (CM), regional offices of the software provider known as Regional Group Manager (RGM), the BSs of ITS and the vehicles to which software would be uploaded. The CM administers the RGM, each RGM administers the BSs of that region and each BS manages the vehicles within its cell. Multicast routing data, i.e., the software packets, is sent to the regional offices first using web-based reliable and secure multicast protocol such as IP multicast [18] . Upon successful reception of software packets, each RGM forms a multicast group with its underlying BSs to securely transmit the software packets to them. In order to transmit the software to vehicles, several BSs together form a multicast group depending on their location and vehicles under those BSs are also the members of that multicast group. In this paper, we describe how multicast data could be transmitted from RGM to BSs and then to mobile vehicles. Hence, the rest of the paper will explain key management for RGM-BS and BS-vehicles multicast groups. In order to facilitate the key management technique of the multicast group, we identify some features of the proposed multicast architecture:
1. The large multicast group, which consists of CM and desired vehicles, is split into small subgroups based on region and a RGM is responsible for distributing software to the vehicles in conjunction with the BSs located in its region. Hence, the key management follows decentralized key management approach. [4] [5] [9] [10] . Consequently, there is no need for updating the SK when a member joins or leaves a cell within the same multicast group. However, periodic key refreshment is necessary to protect the system security against cryptanalysis attack. 6. Since periodic keying will be performed, all the BSs in a multicast group should have their clock synchronized so that they re-key at the same time. This ensures that if a vehicle moves from one cell to another, it still can receive the same multicast data. 7. The number of vehicles under one BS forms a wireless multicast group. Since the road trajectory is known, the number of group members under one BS is predictable. 8. Vehicles provide sufficient computational and power resources. Moreover, exponential increase in processing power and related improvements in computational platform will make the vehicle's processor more powerful. This allows vehicle's processor to compute complex cryptographic algorithms.
GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT
Appendix A defines all the notations that have been used in the following sections.
Vehicle's Authentication Key
While a wireless device is installed in a vehicle V i , a set of authentication keys is supplied to it. Both the AC's secure server and the regional office's secure server to which V i is registered keep a copy of these keys. The S i uses one of these authentication keys,
authenticate V i before starting j th multicast session. Different keys will be used to authenticate V i at different software distribution sessions. If the first set of keys is utilized, RGM will generate and distribute a new set of keys to V i and save it to its own server and in AC's server. Any authorized third party such as other RGMs can get access to a vehicle's authentication keys by using its VIN number. We assume that the AC or any other Certification Authority (CA) issues Digital Certificates to RGM and all members of S which contain their public-key. An RGM may obtain BSs' public-keys residing in its region and other RGMs's public-keys from the AC/CA. A S i is assumed to have a copy of the public-key of its associated RGM and may obtain other S i s' public-keys from the RGM. All the vehicles registered in certain region are assumed to have a copy of the public-key of that region's RGM. When a S i forms a subgroup with the vehicles within its cell, it will broadcast its public-key to its group members. The RGM or S i digitally signs the entire software using its private key and other group members can verify the signature using sender's public-key.
Multicast Groups for Data and Control
As mentioned earlier, there are two types of multicast groups under one RGM. The S associated with one RGM form a multicast group, named as 'All-BS' group, to receive software packets from the RGM. All-BS group is a permanent group and it has fixed number of members. The S is divided into clusters of S Ci depending on their location. One such cluster along with their underlying vehicles V Ci makes another group, known as 'multicast group' (MG).
The MG is again divided into two subgroups: 'Data Group' (DG) and 'Control Group' (CG). The DG comprises V Ci and the CG comprises S Ci . Each CG in an MG is predefined and fixed whereas DG is dynamic i.e., the group members change with time. Multicast data is first routed to the ALL-BS group from RGM; CG of each MG retrieves the data, caches it and forwards it to their corresponding DG.
Agreement of session keys
For the ALL-BS group, RGM generates a session key A_BS k and transmits it to S i after successful authentication. Each MG under one region has its own session key i C k which could be generated either by S Ci using a group key agreement algorithm or the RGM. The CG encrypts the multicast data using this key whereas the DG decrypts the data with this key. Each S i of an ALL-BS group pair-wise shares a private-key, known as BS authentication key i S k with the RGM which could be established during service agreement between AC and ITS/Cellular Company. This is one-to-one secure channel through which a S i can communicate securely with the RGM. Since the CG in a MG is considered to be permanent, each CG has a shared secret-key 
Trust Considerations
For remote software upload, we assume that the AC establishes an agreement either with cellular service provider or ITS to use their infrastructure. It is assumed that the ITS or cellular infrastructure is fully trusted, i.e., all BSs and RGM trust each other and each vehicle in a cell trusts its BS. Hence, the BSs could also participate in key management protocol [4] .
Multicast Session Establishment
Upon receiving software packets from CM, the RGM performs the following steps to initiate a multicast session within its domain. 4. After receiving successful join-acceptance message from ALL-BS group, the RGM starts sending software packets encrypted with A_BS k . It also sends the message digest (MD) of the software signed by its private key. This provides the integrity and authenticity of the software packets. Fig. 3 presents the flow chart for ALL-BS multicast session establishment. Protocol messages:
S i broadcasts DG_join_request

Vehicles in V
The S Ci performs the following after obtaining the software packets and 
Periodic re-keying updates symmetric encryption keys after a certain interval. If a cryptographic key is being employed for longer time period, the higher the chance that the key is being successfully cryptanalyzed. As we mentioned earlier, re-keying is not necessary for our software upload multicast session when a member joins/leaves a cell but still remains in the same multicast group. However, in order to prevent any cryptanalysis attack, we recommend for periodic re-keying of both Both RGM and S i halt the multicast data transmission until it receives acknowledgement from their corresponding receivers.
Protocol Messages: 
Confidentiality and Data Integrity
Multicast data is encrypted with SK, which provides the data confidentiality. A symmetric cryptosystem such as DES [22] or AES [23] could be used to perform the encryption and decryption of the software packets. In order to provide the authenticity and data integrity, the RGM creates a 128-bit message digest (MD) of the entire software using MD5 algorithm [24] . It encrypts the MD with its private key, and sends to CG. Each S i decrypts the MD, re-encrypt with its private key and forwards it to the vehicles. Each V i decrypts the MD using i S p , calculates MD of the received software packets and compares it with the decrypted MD. If both match, then the vehicle accepts the software packets. After successfully receiving all the software packets, both BSs and vehicles delete the session key.
Reliability
While a BS sends software packets sequentially, a vehicle receives and stores the packets in its memory buffer. During this process a vehicle may fail to receive one or more packets due to various reasons such as moving from one cell to another, presence of noise etc. If one/more packets are missing in its buffer, the vehicle sends negative acknowledgement (NACK) signals along with the missing packet numbers. On the other hand, after sending all the software packets, a BS waits for NACK from the vehicles for a certain amount of time. If a packet is missing from more than one vehicle then the BS re-broadcast the packet. Otherwise, it retransmits the packet to the vehicle that did not receive the packet.
Vehicle's authentication key management
We assume that each vehicle has n number of authentication keys, which are used for n number of multicast sessions. After j th session the vehicle, CS and RGM's secure server delete j i V k from their memory.
After the n th session, all the keys from 1 i V k to n i V k would be used and the RGM sends another set of n authentication keys to the V i during the n th session via the associated BS. Fig. 6 shows the vehicle's authentication key management technique. 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In measuring the efficiency of our proposed key management technique, we assume that the wireless link used between RGM to BS is 802. 16 WiMAX-2004 (theoretical range 30 miles, 70 Mbps) [19] [20] and from BS to vehicles is 802.16e WiMAX (data rate has not defined yet, approximately 15 Mbps, less than few miles coverage area) [20] . In order to determine the worst-case requirement, we assume that all the vehicles in a road are of a specific type that the AC decides to upload software and the traffic is bumper-to-bumper. Moreover, each vehicle maintains one-second distance (distance traveled in one-second = 1. 
where t e is the encryption time of a message. Depending on the cryptographic technique used, t e varies in the range of ms to micro-sec. Symmetric encryption/decryption is much faster than asymmetric encryption/decryption. Again, public key operation is faster than private key operation. For simplicity, we assume that the RGM, BS and vehicle have high computational power to do the encryption/decryption operations. Hence, t s is approximated as: 
It was shown in [10] that the number of vehicles covered by a BS in rural or urban area and in city area are: 
where, N is the number of roads covered by a S i .
Using the above equations, the time required setting up and re-key All-BS and multicast group depending on the specification mentioned earlier for 802. and 802.16e wireless technologies are shown in Table 2 and  Table 3 , respectively. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a decentralized key management technique for secure multicasting used in remote software upload in future vehicles. As it is summarized in Table 1 , the proposed architecture is scalable, computationally efficient and memory efficient. The time required to establish a secure session is in the range of ms (Table 1 and Table 2 ).
In this architecture, each vehicle has its own authentication keys which is shared with RGM and AC and one authentication key is used only once. The multicast SK is distributed to each vehicle individually using its authentication key which prevent an unauthorized vehicle to get access of the SK. Similarly, each BS shared a secret key with its corresponding RGM by which they could communicate secretly. The RGM's and BSs's digital certificate provide source authenticity and integrity of multicast data. Moreover, the vehicles' ECU and memory buffers should be made as read protected and tamper resistant to protect the AC's proprietary software.
We proposed to use existing wireless technology and infrastructure such as ITS/cellular infrastructure to upload the software remotely. Since, software upload is not a real-time process, it could be done during off-peak hours to avoid bandwidth constraint of peak hours. Hence, it would not require lots of additional money; rather, if implemented successfully, it could save both the AC and users' significant time and money.
